Environmentally Oriented Energy Policy and Stock Returns: An Empirical Analysis by Oberndorfer, Ulrich & Ziegler, Andreas
Dis cus si on Paper No. 06-079
Environmentally Oriented Energy Policy 
and Stock Returns: 
An Empirical Analysis
Ulrich Oberndorfer and Andreas Ziegler
Dis cus si on Paper No. 06-079
Environmentally Oriented Energy Policy 
and Stock Returns: 
An Empirical Analysis
Ulrich Oberndorfer and Andreas Ziegler
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von 
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung 
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other 
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly 
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp06079.pdf
 Non-technical Summary 
This paper examines the effect of environmental regulation on stock returns (as a measure of 
economic performance) for German energy corporations. By using event study methodology 
(including insights from modern empirical finance and therefore also applying the Fama-
French three-factor model to estimate the abnormal daily and monthly stock returns), we con-
sider the last minute victory of the acting government in the 2002 German federal elections to 
the Lower House of Parliament (Bundestag). Previous to the elections, the so-called “red-
green” government coalition consisting of Social Democrats and the Green party was consid-
ered to have about the same chance to win the majority in the Bundestag as the “black-
yellow” opposition consisting of Christian Democrats and the Liberal party. Concerning 
German environmental and particularly energy policy, the result of the elections was crucial: 
While the “red-green” coalition was generally associated with a paradigm shift towards the 
promotion of renewable energies and a phasing out of nuclear energy, the “black-yellow” 
opposition signaled different priorities in line with traditional energy policy. 
The main estimation results of the empirical analysis imply (1) no evidence of a general nega-
tive impact of the 2002 Bundestag elections on stock returns for traditional utilities and (2) a 
positive albeit transitory short-run effect for the entire group of renewable energy corpora-
tions. We conclude that the 2002 Bundestag elections and therefore stringent environmental 
regulation had at least no general negative effect on the economic performance of energy cor-
porations. One reason for the insignificant abnormal stock returns could be that the environ-
mentally oriented energy policy of the acting government was anticipated by the capital mar-
kets before the 2002 Bundestag elections even though the result of the elections was fully 
unpredictable. In this respect, it should be noted that Social Democrats and the Green party 
already formulated their environmental policy at the beginning of the legislation period in 
1998 in the contract stating the political agenda of the coalition and in the following passed 
 some corresponding laws. Therefore, it could be presumed that the traditional utilities reacted 
to comply with this environmental regulation by investing in new sustainable energies and 
technologies between 1998 and 2002. Another reason could be that the compliance costs of 
this energy policy were lower than expected or even negligible since the traditional utilities 
could excuse increases in electricity prices by the “green” policy of the government coalition. 
In this case, compliance costs could have been entirely borne by the final consumers of elec-
tricity also due to their low price elasticity of demand.   
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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effect of environmental regulation on stock returns (as a measure of 
economic performance) for German energy corporations. By using event study methodology, 
we consider the last minute victory of the acting government in the 2002 German federal elec-
tions to the Lower House of Parliament (Bundestag). The government coalition consisted of 
Social Democrats and the Green party and was generally associated with a paradigm shift in 
environmental and particularly energy policy towards the promotion of renewable energies 
and a phasing out of nuclear energy. In contrast, the opposing Christian Democrats and Lib-
eral party signaled different priorities in line with traditional energy policy. Compared with 
other environmental event studies, we include insights from modern empirical finance and 
therefore also apply the Fama-French three-factor model to estimate the abnormal daily and 
monthly stock returns. The main estimation results of the empirical analysis imply (1) no evi-
dence of a general negative impact of the 2002 Bundestag elections on stock returns for tradi-
tional utilities and (2) a positive albeit transitory short-run effect for the entire group of re-
newable energy corporations. We conclude that the 2002 Bundestag elections and therefore 
stringent environmental regulation had at least no general negative effect on the economic 
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than expected.  
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1. Introduction 
The main goal of new and more stringent environmental regulation is in principle the protec-
tion of natural resources. However, the economic effect of environmental regulatory changes 
is also (particularly in periods of small economic growth) widely and controversially disputed 
(see, e.g., the discussion in Jaffe et al., 1994): On the one hand, it is argued that compliance 
with stringent national environmental regulation imposes significant costs for some polluting 
firms or sectors such that the profitability of these firms is hurt and therefore the competitive-
ness of the whole national economy can suffer. On the other hand, the popular Porter hy-
pothesis suggests that environmental regulation provides incentives for companies to innovate 
and that these innovations can stimulate economic growth and competitiveness of the regu-
lated country (Porter and van der Linde, 1995).  
Indeed, the empirical micro-econometric analysis of the effect of environmental regulatory 
changes on the economic performance of firms or sectors is rather difficult. For example, if an 
environmental regulation affects an entire industry, the application of modern micro-
evaluation techniques (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002) is problematic, particularly if yearly data are 
used. Generally, the impact of a regulation can hardly be separated from sectoral impacts if an 
analysis is based on yearly data as it is difficult to filter regulation effects from yearly varia-
tion. However, monthly or daily firm- or sector-level data are inappropriate for many indica-
tors of competitiveness such as exports, sales, Tobin’s Q, or return on assets in being too 
noisy to be a reliable indicator and are sometimes not even available for these intervals. Even 
applying panel data approaches the results can be misleading: For example, the use of pollu-
tion abatement expenditures as a comprehensive indicator for environmental regulatory bur-
den (Pickman, 1998, Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003) is problematic in providing a truly ex-
ogenous measure since the level of these costs also depends on the nature of an industry’s 
response to environmental regulation (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997).  
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In contrast, daily and monthly stock returns are easily accessible and seem furthermore reli-
able indicators for economic performance since the stock price fully reflects all available in-
formation on efficient capital markets (Fama, 1970) and therefore also reflects the discounted 
expected future cash flows for the investors. Based on this, event studies which aim to meas-
ure the effect of a specific event on the value of a corporation (MacKinley, 1997, Kothari and 
Warner, 2006) are a suitable tool to examine the impact of environmental regulation on the 
economic performance of affected corporations. However, this methodology can only be ap-
plied if an environmental regulation is actually an unexpected event. This is obviously the 
reason why event study methodology was seldom used in the past since most environmental 
regulatory changes are debated in the political arena over a long time such that wealth effects 
generally are gradually incorporated into the value of a corporation.  
In this paper we examine the effect of the 2002 German federal elections to the Lower House 
of Parliament (Bundestag) on stock returns for German energy corporations by using this 
event study methodology. The acting government consisted of Social Democrats (SPD) and 
the Green party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) since the 1998 Bundestag elections. Previous to the 
2002 Bundestag elections, this so-called “red-green” coalition was considered to have about 
the same chance to win the majority in the Bundestag as the “black-yellow” opposition con-
sisting of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Liberal party (FDP). The government 
coalition finally celebrated a last minute victory over their opponents, although at nearly the 
slightest possible margin (1.2 percent points of total votes, Gabriel and Völkl, 2003). Con-
cerning German environmental and particularly energy policy, the result of the elections was 
crucial: While the “red-green” coalition was generally associated with a paradigm shift to-
wards the promotion of renewable energies and a phasing out of nuclear energy, the “black-
yellow” opposition signaled different priorities in line with traditional energy policy. Accord-
ing to this, we examine the hypotheses of negative abnormal stock returns for traditional utili-
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ties involved in nuclear energy and of positive abnormal stock returns for corporations exclu-
sively engaged in renewable energies. 
Methodologically, we include insights from modern empirical finance and therefore also ap-
ply the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) to estimate the abnormal stock returns 
besides the one-factor model based on the CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model, Sharpe, 
1964, Lintner, 1965) and the market model (Sharpe, 1963, Fama, 1968). In spite of the supe-
riority of this three-factor model in the explanation of (portfolio) stock returns, environmental 
event studies commonly use the CAPM and particularly the market model so far. Further-
more, most previous studies exclusively analyze abnormal stock returns for several days 
around the considered event. However, it should be noted that daily data tend to be somewhat 
noisy such that asset pricing models based on this type of data do not work very well. Fur-
thermore, a short-term overreaction of the stock markets is possible such that, for example, 
abnormal stock returns at the first day after the event can quickly vanish. Therefore, we apply 
both daily and monthly data in an additional longer-term analysis to examine whether possible 
very short-term abnormal returns persist over time.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the applied event study 
methodology and reviews environmental event studies. In section 3 a short overview of Ger-
man environmentally oriented energy policy measures during the first legislation period of the 
“red-green” coalition between 1998 and 2002 is given. Section 4 describes the used data and 
some details of our event study. In section 5 the estimation results are presented and section 6 
concludes. 
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2. Event Studies 
2.1. Methodology 
Event studies try to examine the stock return behavior for corporations which experience a 
specific event and therefore aim to measure the effect on the value of a corporation 
(MacKinley, 1997, Kothari and Warner, 2006). The main features in the application of event 
studies have not been changed since their development by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama 
et al. (1969). One important assumption in this respect is that capital markets are sufficiently 
efficient to react on events (i.e., new information) regarding expected future profits of af-
fected corporations. Event studies are mostly rested upon the analysis of so-called “normal” 
and “abnormal” returns which are estimated on the basis of asset pricing models. The main 
approaches are the market model (Sharpe, 1963, Fama, 1968) and the one-factor model based 
on the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964, Lintner, 1965) and the market model. The market model for a 
corporation or stock i at the end of period (day or month) t (i = 1,…,N; t = 1,…,T) is: 
  rit = αi + βi rmt + εit 
The combination of the market model and the CAPM leads to the following one-factor model: 
  rit – rft = αi + βi (rmt – rft) + εit 
In these models rit and rmt are the returns for corporation i and the market portfolio at the end 
of period t (i.e., between t–1 and t), rft is the risk-free interest rate at the beginning of period t, 
and εit is the disturbance term with E(εit) = 0 and var(εit) = σε2. Finally, αi and βi besides σε2 
are the unknown parameters and have to be estimated (by OLS). 
Against this background, the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) includes the ex-
cess returns rmt – rft of the market portfolio and two additional factors to explain the excess 
returns rit – rft: 
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  rit – rft = αi + βi1 (rmt – rft) + βi2 SMBt + βi3 HMLt + εit 
SMBt is the difference between the returns for a portfolio comprising stocks of “small” corpo-
rations and a portfolio comprising stocks of “big” corporations and HMLt is the difference 
between the returns for a portfolio comprising stocks of corporations with a “high” book-to-
market equity and a portfolio comprising stocks of corporations with a “low” book-to-market 
equity, respectively, in period t (for details see Fama and French, 1993). The unknown pa-
rameters are now αi, βi1, βi2, and βi3 besides var(εit) = σε2. Many studies show that this three-
factor model has more explanatory power than the one-factor model discussed above, for ex-
ample, Fama and French (1993, 1996) for the U.S., Berkowitz and Qiu (2001) for the Cana-
dian, Hussain et al. (2002) for the British, and Ziegler et al. (2007) for the German stock mar-
ket. While such analyses are carried out with monthly data (and are performed for stock port-
folios), we particularly examine daily data in this paper as it is common in event studies. It 
should be noted that we do not consider two additional bond market risk factors in a five-
factor model as suggested in Fama and French (1993) since they have no additional explana-
tory power for the German stock market (Ziegler et al., 2007).  
Based on the one- or three-factor models, unknown normal (excess) returns E(rit – rft) are de-
fined as the expected returns without conditioning on the event and abnormal returns arit are 
defined as the actual minus the normal returns: 
  arit = (rit – rft) – E(rit – rft) 
The unknown parameters in E(rit – rft) are estimated on the basis of the one- or three-factor 
models for all t in the time interval [T0,…,T1] which is called the estimation window. Based 
on this, the normal and abnormal returns are then estimated for each corporation i and for 
separate periods t in the time interval [T1+1,…,T2] which is called the event window. The es-
timated abnormal returns est(ari) in the one-factor model are then: 
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  est(arit) = (rit – rft) – est(αi) – est(βi) (rmt – rft)  
The corresponding estimated abnormal returns est(ari) in the Fama-French three-factor model 
are: 
  est(arit) = (rit – rft) – est(αi) – est(βi1) (rmt – rft) – est(βi2) SMBt – est(βi3) HMLt  
If the estimation window is sufficiently large, the est(ari) are approximately normally distrib-
uted with E[est(arit)] = 0 and var[est(arit)] = σε2 under the null hypothesis H0 that the event has 
no impact. 
The estimated abnormal returns can be aggregated across corporations and over time. For an 
aggregation across affected corporations the estimated average abnormal returns est(aart) for a 
period t in the event window are the means of the estimated abnormal returns for the corpora-
tions i = 1,…,N: 
  
1
1est(aa ) est(a )t it
N
i
r r
N =
= ∑  
If the estimated abnormal returns are independent across corporations and if the estimation 
window is sufficiently large, the est(aart) are approximately normally distributed with 
E[est(aart)] = 0 and var[est(aart)] = σε2 1/N under the null hypothesis H0 that the event has no 
impact. 
For an aggregation over time the estimated cumulative abnormal returns est(cari) for a corpo-
ration i are the sums of the considered estimated abnormal returns for all periods t from Ta to 
Tb (with T1 < Ta < Tb < T2+1): 
  
b
a
est(ca ) est(a )i it
T
t T
r r
=
= ∑  
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If the estimated abnormal returns are independent over time and if the estimation window is 
sufficiently large, the est(cari) are approximately normally distributed with E[est(cari)] = 0 
and var[est(cari)] = σε2(Tb–Ta+1) under the null hypothesis H0 that the event has no impact. 
For a combined aggregation over time and across affected corporations the estimated average 
cumulative abnormal returns est(acar) are the means of the estimated cumulative abnormal 
returns for the corporations i = 1,…,N  
  
1
1est(aca ) est(ca )
N
i
i
r r
N =
= ∑  
(or, alternatively, the sums of the estimated average abnormal returns over time from Ta to 
Tb). If the estimated cumulative abnormal returns are independent across corporations and if 
the estimation window is sufficiently large, the est(acar) are approximately normally distrib-
uted with E[est(acar)] = 0 and var[est(acar)] = σε2 (Tb-Ta+1) 1/N under the null hypothesis H0 
that the event has no impact. 
In our event study we analyze individual and aggregate abnormal returns. Based on z-
statistics which directly arise from the approximate normal distributions of est(arit), est(aart), 
est(cari), and est(acar) under H0, we can examine whether the 2002 Bundestag elections actu-
ally had an effect on stock returns. In this respect, we apply the traditional one-factor model 
based on the CAPM and the market model as well as the Fama-French three-factor model to 
check the robustness of the estimation results. We analyze several days after the elections as it 
is common in environmental event studies. According to Kothari and Warner (2006), daily 
data permit precise measurements of abnormal returns. Based on the assumption that capital 
markets are sufficiently efficient, these markets should react within a very short-term horizon 
(i.e., within the first day) after the elections since the new information is immediately avail-
able. However, it should be noted that daily data tend to be somewhat noisy such that corre-
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sponding asset pricing models do not work very well. Furthermore, a short-term overreaction 
of the stock markets is possible such that, for example, abnormal stock returns at the first day 
after the event can quickly vanish. Therefore, we apply both daily and monthly data in an ad-
ditional longer-term analysis to examine whether possible very short-term abnormal returns 
persist over time. Due to data availability, the application of monthly data is only possible for 
traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy (see below). 
2.2. Environmental Event Studies 
Event studies are particularly applied in finance and accounting, for example, to examine the 
effect of mergers and acquisitions, earnings announcements, or issues of new debt or equity 
(MacKinley, 1997, Kothari and Warner, 2006). However, they are recently also increasingly 
used to analyze the impact of environmental news on economic performance. Many of these 
studies consider disclosures of information regarding positive or negative corporate environ-
mental performance (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996, Dasgupta et al., 2001, Gupta and 
Goldar, 2005, Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2006). Examples for positive news in this re-
spect are investments in pollution control, environmental awards, or good environmental rat-
ings by NGO. Examples for news regarding negative environmental performance are spills, 
environmental accidents, or bad environmental ratings by NGO. Another widespread indica-
tor in such studies are disclosures of toxic releases (Hamilton, 1995, Konar and Cohen, 1997, 
Khanna et al., 1998).  
These studies play an important role in the discussion of non-mandatory approaches in envi-
ronmental policy to foster corporate environmental performance (Khanna, 2001). If the stock 
markets (as shown in many of those studies) react to bad environmental news with negative 
abnormal returns and to good environmental news with positive abnormal returns for the af-
fected corporations, the release of information regarding corporate environmental perform-
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ance can be an important tool for environmental policy. These measures could in such cases 
supplement traditional mandatory environmental command and control regulation which is 
often considered to be too centralized instruments producing immense bureaucracy at the 
governmental level. Nevertheless, it should be noted that stringent environmental regulation 
cannot fully be substituted by these information oriented approaches to protect the natural 
resources, particularly if the stock markets do not react on corporate environmental news. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from event studies considering corporate environmental 
news which are more related to environmental regulation. These analyses consider the effect 
of violations of or non-compliance with environmental regulation or lawsuits due to such vio-
lations (Muoghalu et al., 1990, Laplante and Lanoie, 1994, Lanoie et al., 1998, Karpoff et al., 
2005, Dasgupta et al., 2006). These studies can also contribute to a guideline for environ-
mental policy. However, they do not examine the effect of environmental regulation itself on 
stock returns for affected corporations, either. One obvious reason for the rare application of 
event studies analyzing environmental regulation in the past is that this methodology requires 
that its announcement (or the announcement of regulation in general, Binder, 1985) consti-
tutes an event that was not anticipated before. Indeed, most environmental regulation is de-
bated in the political arena over a long time such that accompanying wealth effects generally 
are gradually incorporated into the value of a corporation. 
One early event study analyzing the effect of environmental regulation can be found in Butler 
and McNertney (1991). This study even considers the effect of elections, namely the 1982 
state-wide gubernatorial elections in six US states. These states were identified as those where 
the election results were uncertain and expected to affect environmental regulation for energy 
utilities. The study shows that in those states in which the victory of a Democratic governor 
was most unpredictable significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns arise. Blacconiere 
and Northcut (1997) consider the impact of the US Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
 11
tion Act (SARA) of 1986 on stock returns for corporations from the chemical industry. While 
the study cannot find significant cumulative abnormal returns when all 26 SARA related 
events are considered, an analysis of only 17 of these events provides significantly negative 
cumulative abnormal returns. Tawil (1999) examines the 1994 US Supreme Court’s ruling 
that flow-control laws are unconstitutional concerning abnormal returns for hauling-landfill or 
waste-to-energy corporations. However, no significant abnormal returns for any industry oc-
cur. Two recent studies consider the effect of the US Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 on 
stock returns for energy utilities (Diltz, 2002, Kahn and Knittel, 2003). Both studies examine 
several milestones in the passage of the amendments. Kahn and Knittel (2003) also analyze 
the effect of the 1988 presidential elections. Obviously due to the long debate in the political 
arena, most of the analyzed events over the nearly two years produce no significant cumula-
tive abnormal returns. 
Methodologically, most environmental event studies consider the two-stage estimation as dis-
cussed above, i.e., in the first stage, the estimation of the asset pricing models’ parameters in 
the estimation window and based on this, in the second stage, the estimation of abnormal re-
turns in the event window. Only some of them estimate the abnormal returns at once by in-
cluding dummy variables in the OLS regression (Butler and McNertney, 1991, Blacconiere 
and Northcut, 1997, Kahn and Knittel, 2003). Furthermore, most studies (and in fact all stud-
ies cited above except Tawil, 1999, who use a multifactor model) apply versions of the market 
model or the one-factor model based on the CAPM and the market model with daily data. 
Diltz (2002) is one exemption in that he does not exclusively analyze abnormal returns for 
several days around the considered event but also considers monthly data therefore addition-
ally examining a longer-term horizon. 
However, a problem as aforementioned is that the market model (as the one-factor model) 
particularly on the basis of monthly data clearly works worse in explaining stock returns than 
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the Fama-French three-factor model. As a consequence, the estimations of abnormal returns 
could be biased. To our knowledge, no environmental event study has applied the Fama-
French three-factor model so far as it is common in modern empirical finance. Even Tawil 
(1999) does not include the usual Fama-French risk factors in her multifactor model based on 
daily as well as weekly data. In contrast, we examine, on the one hand, both the one-factor 
model and the Fama-French three-factor model and, on the other hand, both daily and 
monthly (when traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy are considered) data to check 
the robustness of the estimation results regarding the effect of the 2002 Bundestag elections. 
3. German Environmentally Oriented Energy Policy from 1998 to 2002 
After the 1998 Bundestag elections the German Green party participated in a national gov-
ernment for the first time in history. The leading party of the corresponding “red-green” coali-
tion were the Social Democrats. This coalition was generally associated with a paradigm shift 
in environmental and particularly energy policy as it was already formulated in the contract 
stating the political agenda of the coalition. According to this, German voters institutionalized 
a general policy that was also oriented on environmental targets (Oberndorfer, 2005). Two 
major goals for the legislation period of the “red-green” coalition towards an environmentally 
oriented energy policy were the promotion of renewable energies and a phasing out of nuclear 
energy. These goals formed already part of the officially announced program for the first 100 
days of government (“100-Tage-Programm”).  
Although the “red-green” coalition failed to implement this energy policy as quickly, it 
achieved at least a fundamental change until the end of the legislation period (Mez, 2003). In 
March 2000 the “Stromeinspeisungsgesetz”, a law that served as an economic baseline for the 
supply of renewable energies since 1990, was replaced by a law institutionalizing the promo-
tion of renewable energies (“Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz” or “EEG”). This law set technol-
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ogy specific feed-in tariffs above the prices for generating electricity from fossil fuels (e.g., 
coal or gas) while at the same time power distributors were obliged to buy this power. Stake-
holders and environmental experts considered this law particularly successful due to the 
growing shares of “green energy” in overall energy generation in Germany and due to the 
high investments in the renewable energy sector (Kern et al., 2004). Furthermore, negotiations 
between the government and the power supply industry (“Energiekonsensgespräche”) were 
conducted from the beginning of the legislation period. These negotiations led in June 2000 to 
an agreement (“Atomkonsens”) and in April 2002 to the amendment of a nuclear power law 
(“Atomgesetz”). According to this, the operation of existing nuclear power plants was re-
stricted to an average regular duration of 32 years without financial compensation of the af-
fected utilities and the future construction of new nuclear power plants was legally dispelled.  
Against this background, Social Democrats and the Green party stood for their new environ-
mentally oriented energy policy regarding the phasing out of nuclear energy and even sug-
gested more pronounced measures towards the promotion of renewable energies (proposing a 
doubling of the share of renewable energies in overall power generation) in their campaigns 
for the 2002 Bundestag elections. In contrast, the opposing Christian Democrats and Liberal 
party signaled different priorities in line with traditional energy policy. They particularly pro-
claimed the comeback of nuclear energy. They questioned the danger of German nuclear 
power plants and furthermore argued that a phasing out of nuclear energy combined with ex-
cessive promotion of renewable energies could, on the one hand, increase electricity prices for 
households and industry and could, on the other hand, make it expensive to reach long-term 
climate policy goals. A withdrawal of the nuclear power law through the “black-yellow” op-
position would have broadened the activity fields of traditional utilities.  
Previous to the elections on September 22, 2002, the “red-green” coalition was considered to 
have about the same chance to win the majority in the Bundestag as the “black-yellow” oppo-
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sition. The government coalition finally celebrated a last minute victory over their opponents, 
although at nearly the slightest possible margin (1.2 percent points of total votes, Gabriel and 
Völkl, 2003). Due to the unpredictability of the elections result and the underlying different 
environmental and energy policy programs, we examine the hypotheses of negative abnormal 
stock returns for traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy and of positive abnormal 
stocks returns for corporations exclusively engaged in renewable energies.  
4. Data and Details of the Event Study 
In our event study we analyze the effect of the 2002 Bundestag elections on stock returns for 
German energy corporations. We consider as aforementioned two groups of energy corpora-
tions: Traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy and corporations exclusively engaged in 
renewable energies. Regarding the first group, financial data (stock returns, market and book 
values) for overall N = 5 corporations are available, namely for ENBW, EON, MVV, RWE, 
and VATTENFALL. Regarding the second group, corresponding data for overall N = 7 cor-
porations are available, namely for EECH, ENERGIEKONTOR, NORDEX, SOLARPARC, 
SOLARWORLD, SUNWAYS, and UMWELTKONTOR. 
Our financial data stem from a carefully controlled database for German stock corporations of 
Richard Stehle from Humboldt University Berlin, Germany (Stehle and Hartmond, 1991, 
Schulz and Stehle, 2002). The data contain the daily and monthly (discrete) stock returns rit 
and rmt (in %) for the aforementioned energy corporations and for the German market portfo-
lio which comprises all stocks traded on the Frankfurt stock exchange. To calculate the two 
risk factors SMBt and HMLt for the estimation of the Fama-French three-factor model, the 
data also contain the market and book values of all corporations whose stocks are traded on 
the Frankfurt stock exchange except banks and insurances as well as stock corporations with 
negative book values (for details see Ziegler et al., 2007). The daily and monthly risk-free 
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interest rates rft (in %) are based on the one-month Frankfurt Interbank Offered Rate (FIBOR) 
and the one-month Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR). 
Our analyzed event date is September 22, 2002, i.e., the date the Bundestag elections took 
place. When daily data are considered, we define the 120 trading days prior to this event as 
our estimation window [T0,…,T1]. Therefore, T0 = T1–119 represents April 5, 2002, and T1 
represents September 20, 2002. When monthly data are examined, we include all months 
from January 1993 in our estimation window. However, it should be noted that most renew-
able energy corporations are rather new such that the lengths T1–T0+1 of the estimation win-
dows are typically very low in these cases. As a consequence, we do not consider this group 
of energy corporations in detail with monthly data. The estimation windows also start later 
than January 1993 for two out of the five traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy due to 
the lack of data with T1–T0+1 = 58 for ENBW, T1–T0+1 = 41 for MVV, and T1–T0 +1 = 116 
otherwise. Indeed, T1 represents in all cases August 2002. These windows are used for the 
estimation of the unknown parameters αi and βi in the one-factor model based on the CAPM 
and the market model as well as of the unknown parameters αi, βi1,, βi2, and βi3 in the Fama-
French three-factor model. 
Based on the parameter estimates est(αi) and est(βi) or est(αi), est(βi1), est(βi2), and est(βi3), 
the abnormal returns are estimated (for the i = 1,…,5 traditional utilities and the i = 1,…,7 
renewable energy corporations). When daily data are considered, we define as our event win-
dow [T1+1,…,T2] the 15 trading days after the 2002 Bundestag elections on September 22. 
Therefore, T1+1 here is September 23, 2002, and T2 represents October 11, 2002. In this event 
window all individual abnormal returns ari based on both the one-factor and three-factor 
models are estimated. In contrast, the average abnormal returns aart for the five traditional 
utilities and for the seven renewable energy corporations, respectively, are only estimated for t 
= T1+1. Furthermore, we estimate some cumulative abnormal returns cari. While Ta is always 
 16
T1+1, we consider different time periods such that Tb varies between T1+2, T1+5, and T1+15 
and therefore the analyzed lengths of time periods vary between two, five, and 15 days. Fi-
nally, we estimate the average cumulative abnormal returns acar for the three aforementioned 
time periods.  
When monthly data are considered for the five traditional utilities, we define as our event 
window [T1+1,…,T2] the three months after the 2002 Bundestag elections in September. 
Therefore, T1+1 represents October 2002 and T2 is December 2002. In this event window all 
individual abnormal returns ari are again estimated. In contrast, the average abnormal returns 
aart are only examined for t = T1+1. Furthermore, we estimate the cumulative abnormal re-
turns cari with Ta = T1+1 and Tb = T1+3. Finally, the corresponding average cumulative ab-
normal returns acar are estimated. To compare the estimation results with monthly data, cu-
mulative abnormal daily returns cari are also estimated for the periods from October 1, 2002, 
to October 30, 2002, and from October 1, 2002, to December 30, 2002. In this respect, the 
event window as discussed above is (also for the seven renewable energy corporations) ex-
tended. Furthermore, the average cumulative abnormal daily returns acar are estimated for 
these two periods.  
5. Estimation Results 
5.1. Traditional Utilities Involved in Nuclear Energy 
Table 1 reports for the five traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy summary statistics 
of the estimation results regarding abnormal returns for September 23, i.e., the day after the 
2002 Bundestag elections, and some cumulative abnormal daily returns for different periods 
as well as estimated average abnormal returns for September 23 and some estimated average 
cumulative abnormal daily returns for different periods based on both the one- and the three-
factor model, respectively. Table 2 (based on the one-factor model) and Table 3 (based on the 
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three-factor model) additionally report for each of the five traditional utilities the correspond-
ing estimated abnormal returns for each of the 15 trading days after the elections as well as 
corresponding estimated cumulative abnormal daily returns.  
According to these tables, the average abnormal returns for September 23 and the average 
cumulative abnormal returns for the first two, five, and 15 days after the elections across all 
corporations do not differ from zero at any common level of significance, irrespective of the 
application of the one- or three-factor model. Instead, positive est(ari) arise for three out of the 
five traditional utilities for September 23 and positive est(cari) even arise for each of the tradi-
tional utilities from September 23 to September 27. However, a significant cumulative ab-
normal return for the first two, five, or 15 days after the elections occurs for none of the five 
traditional utilities. According to these estimation results, there is no evidence of a negative 
impact of the 2002 Bundestag elections on stock returns and therefore on the economic per-
formance for the traditional utilities. 
In contrast, the estimated average cumulative abnormal returns are negative for all trading 
days in October and for all trading days from October to December. Surprisingly, these aver-
age cumulative abnormal returns even differ from zero at the 10% level of significance for the 
latter period. As aforementioned, the robustness of these estimation results should be tested by 
the application of monthly data since asset pricing models based on daily data are less reliable 
than those based on monthly data. Table 4 reports summary statistics of the corresponding 
estimation results regarding abnormal returns for October, i.e., the month after the 2002 
Bundestag elections, and cumulative abnormal monthly returns from October to December as 
well as estimated average abnormal returns for October and estimated average cumulative 
abnormal monthly returns from October to December. Table 5 additionally reports for each of 
the five traditional utilities the corresponding estimated abnormal returns for October, No-
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vember, and December, respectively, as well as the corresponding estimated cumulative ab-
normal monthly returns from October to December.  
According to this, the tendency of the estimation results based on daily data is strengthened. 
The average abnormal returns for October are different from zero at the 10% level of signifi-
cance and the average cumulative abnormal returns are different from zero at the 5% level of 
significance. However, it should be noted that these estimation results are exclusively trig-
gered by strongly negative estimated abnormal monthly returns for only two utilities, namely 
EON and RWE. Therefore, we assume that these surprising negative estimated abnormal re-
turns are influenced by other singular factors and not by the 2002 Bundestag elections since 
no significantly negative abnormal returns arise for the other three traditional utilities. Instead, 
even a significantly positive abnormal return for December occurs for ENBW and MVV. Fur-
thermore, the stock markets should have reacted within a very short-term horizon if the elec-
tions actually had an impact since the new information was immediately available. As dis-
cussed above, however, no significant cumulative abnormal return in the first 15 days occurs 
for EON and RWE, either. 
5.2. Corporations Exclusively Engaged in Renewable Energies 
Table 6 reports for the seven corporations exclusively engaged in renewable energies (just 
like Table 1 for the five traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy) summary statistics of 
the estimation results regarding abnormal returns for September 23 and some cumulative ab-
normal daily returns for different periods as well as estimated average abnormal returns for 
September 23 and some estimated average cumulative abnormal daily returns for different 
periods. Additionally, Table 7 (based on the one-factor model) and Table 8 (based on the 
three-factor model) report (as Table 2 and Table 3 for the traditional utilities) for each of the 
seven renewable energy corporations the corresponding estimated abnormal returns for each 
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of the 15 trading days after the elections as well as corresponding estimated cumulative ab-
normal daily returns.  
According to these tables, positive est(ari) for September 23 arise for six out of the seven re-
newable energy corporations and the average abnormal return for September 23 strongly dif-
fers from zero at the 1% level of significance. Furthermore, a significant cumulative abnormal 
return from September 23 to September 24 occurs. In this respect, the estimated impact of the 
2002 Bundestag elections is stronger when the three-factor model is applied. However, a 
short-term overreaction of the stock markets is possible since the average cumulative abnor-
mal returns for the first five and 15 days after the elections do not differ from zero at any 
common level of significance, irrespective of the application of the one- or three-factor 
model. Furthermore, it should be noted that the clearly positive est(aart) for September 23 and 
the clearly positive est(acar) from September 23 to September 24 are strongly influenced by 
the est(ari) and est(cari) for only one corporation, namely SUNWAYS.  
Finally, the cumulative abnormal returns for all trading days in October and from October to 
December do not differ from zero at any common level of significance. Regarding the latter 
period, even clearly negative est(cari) arise for six out of the seven renewable energy corpora-
tions, particularly for EECH. As a consequence, the est(acar) are also clearly negative. The 
similarity of these estimation results with those for the two traditional utilities EON and RWE 
strengthen our reasoning above that these negative estimated abnormal returns are influenced 
by other singular factors and not by the 2002 Bundestag elections. However, these estimation 
results for the seven renewable energy corporations should be treated with caution: On the 
one hand, the volatility of the corresponding daily stock returns is extremely high such that, 
for example, even an est(cari) of nearly -50% for EECH from October 01 to December 30 
does not lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis that the cari is zero, irrespective of the ap-
plication of the one- or three-factor model. On the other hand, it should be noted that the time 
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series of daily returns show very often values of zero for renewable energy corporations (and 
to a clearly less extent for traditional utilities) since the corresponding stocks were not traded 
on these days. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper examines the effect of environmental regulation on stock returns and therefore on 
the economic performance for German energy corporations. It analyzes the last minute victory 
of the acting government consisting of Social Democrats and the Green party in the 2002 
Bundestag elections. Previous to the elections, this “red-green” coalition was considered to 
have about the same chance to win the majority in the Bundestag as the “black-yellow” oppo-
sition consisting of Christian Democrats and the Liberal party. Concerning German environ-
mental and particularly energy policy, the result of the elections was crucial: While the “red-
green” coalition was generally associated with a paradigm shift towards the promotion of re-
newable energies and a phasing out of nuclear energy, the “black-yellow” opposition signaled 
different priorities in line with traditional energy policy. The main estimation results of the 
event study imply (1) no evidence of a general negative impact of the 2002 Bundestag elec-
tions on stock returns for traditional utilities and (2) a positive albeit transitory short-run ef-
fect for the entire group of renewable energy corporations. We conclude that the 2002 
Bundestag elections and therefore stringent environmental regulation had at least no general 
negative effect on the economic performance of energy corporations.  
One reason for the insignificant abnormal stock returns could be that the environmentally ori-
ented energy policy of the acting government was anticipated by the capital markets before 
the 2002 Bundestag elections even though the result of the elections was fully unpredictable. 
In this respect, it should be noted that Social Democrats and the Green party already formu-
lated their environmental policy at the beginning of the legislation period in 1998 in the con-
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tract stating the political agenda of the coalition and in the following passed some correspond-
ing laws. Therefore, it could be presumed that the traditional utilities reacted to comply with 
this environmental regulation by investing in new sustainable energies and technologies be-
tween 1998 and 2002. Another reason could be that the compliance costs of this energy policy 
were lower than expected or even negligible since the traditional utilities could excuse in-
creases in electricity prices by the “green” policy of the government coalition. In this case, 
compliance costs could have been entirely borne by the final consumers of electricity also due 
to their low price elasticity of demand (Diltz, 2002, Kahn and Knittel, 2003).  
Methodologically, the application of the Fama-French three-factor model leads in some cases 
to slightly different estimation results compared with the application of the one-factor model 
based on the CAPM and the market model. However, it should be noted that the use of both 
asset pricing models lead to basically the same conclusions of our event study. Nevertheless, 
we favor the application of modern asset pricing models in future environmental event studies 
to test the robustness of the estimation results as it is standard meanwhile in empirical finance. 
In this respect, an interesting direction for further research is the application of alternative 
multifactor models such as the four-factor model according to Carhart (1997).  
Surprisingly, negative estimated cumulative abnormal returns for two traditional utilities in-
volved in nuclear energy arise from October to December 2002. In this respect, the use of 
monthly data provides slightly different estimation results compared with the use of daily 
data. This supports our suggestion that asset pricing models based on monthly data should, if 
possible, be applied as a robustness check for the estimation results. In spite of these results, it 
should be noted that the stock markets should have reacted within a very short-term horizon if 
the 2002 Bundestag elections actually had an impact since the new information regarding en-
vironmentally oriented energy policy was immediately available. However, no significant 
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cumulative abnormal return in the first 15 days after the elections occurs for any traditional 
utility.  
Apart from this, it could be questioned whether our event study approach which was devel-
oped for short-term analyses is fully reliable for longer-term considerations. Therefore, an-
other direction for further research is the application of long-term event study approaches as 
they were developed and applied in modern financial economics (e.g., Barber and Lyon, 
1997, Kothari and Warner, 1997, Lyon et al., 1999, Mitchell und Stafford, 2000, Ho, 2005). A 
final direction for further research is the analysis of the robustness of our estimation results 
concerning the unreliable time series of daily stock returns (particularly regarding the exam-
ined renewable energy corporations). The fundamental question in this respect is whether re-
peated returns of zero (as a result of the fact that the corresponding stocks were not traded on 
these days) can lead to systematic biased estimates of abnormal returns. 
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Appendix: Tables 
Table 1: Estimated abnormal returns est(ari), estimated average abnormal returns est(aart), es-
timated cumulative abnormal returns est(cari), and estimated average cumulative abnormal 
returns est(acar) for the five traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy, basis: daily data 
Day Number of  
negative est(ari) 
based on the one-
factor model       
(number of ari 
which differ from 
zero at the 5% level 
of  significance)         
Number of  
negative est(ari)  
based on the three-
factor model       
(number of ari 
which differ from 
zero at the 5% level 
of  significance)         
est(aart) based on 
the one-factor 
model 
(z-statistic) 
est(aart) based on 
the three-factor 
model 
(z-statistic) 
September 23  2 
(0) 
2 
(0) 
0.11 
(0.18) 
0.29 
(0.46) 
Period Number of  
negative est(cari)   
based on the one-
factor model  
(number of cari 
which differ from 
zero at the 5% level 
of  significance)         
Number of  
negative est(cari)  
based on the three-
factor model     
(number of cari 
which differ from 
zero at the 5% level 
of  significance)        
est(acar) based on 
the one-factor 
model 
(z-statistics) 
est(acar) based on 
the three-factor 
model 
(z-statistics) 
September 23 – 
September 24 
(two trading days  
after the event) 
3 
(0) 
3 
(0) 
-0.97 
(-1.07) 
-0.67 
(-0.74) 
September 23 – 
September 27 
(five trading days  
after the event) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
1.42 
(0.99) 
1.74 
(1.22) 
September 23 – 
October 11 
(15 trading days 
after the event) 
3 
(0) 
2 
(0) 
-0.81 
(-0.33) 
-0.07 
(-0.03) 
October 01 – 
October 31 
5 
(0) 
5 
(0) 
-4.29 
(-1.43) 
-4.12 
(-1.38) 
October 01 – 
December 30 
3 
(1) 
3 
(1) 
 -8.65* 
(-1.72) 
 -8.90* 
(-1.78) 
Note: * (*, ***) means that the null hypothesis that the average abnormal returns aart or the average cumulative 
abnormal returns acar are zero can be rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance (according to the corre-
sponding two-tailed z-test). 
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Table 2: Estimated abnormal returns est(ari) and estimated cumulative abnormal returns 
est(cari) for each of the five traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy, basis: daily data 
and one-factor model 
 ENBW EON MVV RWE VATTENFALL 
Day Estimated abnormal returns est(ari) 
(z-statistics) 
September 23 0.22 (0.28) 
-1.14 
(-0.76) 
1.80 
(1.25) 
-0.48 
(-0.32) 
0.17 
(0.10) 
September 24 0.18 (0.22) 
-1.16 
(-0.77) 
-0.51 
(-0.36) 
-2.07 
(-1.38) 
-1.84 
(-1.07) 
September 25  1.36
* 
(1.70) 
2.41 
(1.60) 
0.34 
(0.24) 
1.56 
(1.04) 
1.07 
(0.62) 
September 26   -1.68
** 
(-2.10) 
   6.62*** 
(4.40) 
-0.92 
(-0.63) 
   5.39*** 
(3.61) 
-1.54 
(-0.89) 
September 27 0.19 (0.24) 
-2.29 
(-1.52) 
0.95 
(0.66) 
   -4.04*** 
(-2.71) 
2.49 
(1.44) 
September 30 0.31 (0.38) 
   3.90*** 
(2.59) 
0.49 
(0.34) 
2.15 
(1.44) 
0.19 
(0.11) 
October 01 -0.17 (-0.21) 
 2.76* 
(1.83) 
-1.35 
(-0.93) 
-0.61 
(-0.41) 
-0.77 
(-0.45) 
October 02 -0.11 (-0.14) 
 2.93* 
(1.95) 
-1.26 
(-0.87) 
   5.17*** 
(3.46) 
-0.22 
(-0.13) 
October 03 0.23 (0.28) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
-1.18 
(-0.79) 
2.72 
(1.57) 
October 04 0.20 (0.25) 
 -2.85* 
(-1.90) 
1.32 
(0.92) 
-1.53 
(-1.02) 
-0.43 
(-0.25) 
October 07 0.12 (0.14) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.83 
(0.57) 
0.61 
(0.40) 
-2.06 
(-1.19) 
October 08 0.11 (0.14) 
2.42 
(1.61) 
0.48 
(0.33) 
  3.70** 
(2.47) 
-1.06 
(-0.61) 
October 09 0.07 (0.09) 
   -5.78*** 
(-3.84) 
  -2.93** 
(-2.03) 
  -3.23** 
(-2.16) 
0.52 
(0.30) 
October 10 -0.27 (-0.34) 
   -4.66*** 
(-3.10) 
0.86 
(0.60) 
  -3.58** 
(-2.40) 
-0.37 
(-0.21) 
October 11 -0.41 (-0.51) 
 -2.60* 
(-1.73) 
-1.44 
(-1.00) 
   -3.88*** 
(-2.59) 
-0.51 
(-0.29) 
Period Estimated cumulative abnormal returns est(cari) 
(z-statistics) 
September 23 – 
September 24 
0.40 
(0.35) 
-2.30 
(-1.08) 
1.28 
(0.63) 
-2.54 
(-1.20) 
-1.67 
(-0.68) 
September 23 – 
September 27 
0.27 
(0.15) 
4.43 
(1.32) 
1.66 
(0.51) 
0.37 
(0.11) 
0.35 
(0.09) 
September 23 – 
October 11 
0.34 
(0.11) 
0.57 
(0.10) 
-1.33 
(-0.24) 
-2.02 
(-0.35) 
-1.63 
(-0.24) 
October 01 – 
October 31 
-0.53 
(-0.14) 
-9.94 
(-1.41) 
-5.24 
(-0.77) 
-1.16 
(-0.17) 
-4.55 
(-0.56) 
October 01 – 
December 30 
8.27 
(1.31) 
-25.57** 
(-2.16) 
1.67 
(0.15) 
-21.98* 
(-1.87) 
-5.62 
(-0.41) 
Note: * (**, ***) means that the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns ari or the cumulative abnormal returns 
cari are zero can be rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance (according to the corresponding two-
tailed z-test). 
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Table 3: Estimated abnormal returns est(ari) and estimated cumulative abnormal returns 
est(cari) for each of the five traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy, basis: daily data 
and three-factor model 
 ENBW EON MVV RWE VATTENFALL 
Day Estimated abnormal returns est(ari) 
(z-statistics) 
September 23 0.30 (0.37) 
-1.08 
(-0.72) 
1.98 
(1.38) 
-0.23 
(-0.15) 
0.50 
(0.29) 
September 24 0.26 (0.33) 
-1.16 
(-0.77) 
-0.34 
(-0.24) 
-1.95 
(-1.31) 
-1.61 
(-0.94) 
September 25  1.32
* 
(1.66) 
2.38 
(1.59) 
0.25 
(0.17) 
1.45 
(0.98) 
0.92 
(0.54) 
September 26  -1.50
* 
(-1.89) 
   6.50*** 
(4.33) 
-0.59 
(-0.41) 
   5.29*** 
(3.55) 
-1.36 
(-0.79) 
September 27 0.27 (0.33) 
-2.36 
(-1.58) 
1.09 
(0.76) 
   -4.14*** 
(-2.79) 
2.52 
(1.47) 
September 30 0.18 (0.23) 
   4.10*** 
(2.73) 
0.29 
(0.20) 
 2.53* 
(1.70) 
0.32 
(0.18) 
October 01 -0.06 (-0.07) 
 2.62* 
(1.75) 
-1.16 
(-0.81) 
-0.83 
(-0.56) 
-0.78 
(-0.46) 
October 02 0.03 (0.04) 
 2.91* 
(1.94) 
-0.96 
(-0.67) 
   5.31*** 
(3.57) 
0.12 
(0.07) 
October 03 0.27 (0.34) 
-0.02 
(-0.01) 
0.08 
(0.06) 
-1.27 
(-0.85) 
2.70 
(1.57) 
October 04 0.15 (0.19) 
 -2.76* 
(-1.84) 
1.26 
(0.87) 
-1.34 
(-0.90) 
-0.34 
(-0.20) 
October 07 0.28 (0.36) 
-0.14 
(-0.09) 
1.14 
(0.79) 
0.45 
(0.30) 
-1.93 
(-1.12) 
October 08 0.01 (0.01) 
 2.50* 
(1.67) 
0.29 
(0.20) 
  3.81** 
(2.56) 
-1.12 
(-0.65) 
October 09 0.16 (0.20) 
    -5.81*** 
(-3.87) 
 -2.76* 
(-1.92) 
  -3.21** 
(-2.16) 
0.68 
(0.39) 
October 10 -0.12 (-0.15) 
    -4.78*** 
(-3.18) 
1.14 
(0.79) 
  -3.71** 
(-2.50) 
-0.25 
(-0.14) 
October 11 -0.40 (-0.51) 
 -2.64* 
(-1.76) 
-1.45 
(-1.01) 
    -3.97*** 
(-2.67) 
-0.58 
(-0.34) 
Period Estimated cumulative abnormal returns est(cari) 
(z-statistics) 
September 23 – 
September 24 
0.56 
(0.49) 
-2.24 
(-1.05) 
1.64 
(0.81) 
-2.17 
(-1.03) 
-1.11 
(-0.46) 
September 23 – 
September 27 
0.64 
(0.36) 
4.28 
(1.28) 
2.39 
(0.74) 
0.42 
(0.13) 
0.97 
(0.25) 
September 23 – 
October 11 
1.14 
(0.37) 
0.27 
(0.05) 
0.27 
(0.05) 
-1.81 
(-0.31) 
-0.21 
(-0.03) 
October 01 – 
October 31 
-0.18 
(-0.05) 
-10.20 
  (-1.45) 
-4.59 
(-0.68) 
-1.42 
(-0.20) 
-4.22 
(-0.52) 
October 01 – 
December 30 
8.21 
(1.31) 
-25.70** 
 (-2.17) 
1.50 
(0.13) 
-22.42* 
(-1.91) 
-6.08 
(-0.45) 
Note: * (**, ***) means that the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns ari or the cumulative abnormal returns 
cari are zero can be rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance (according to the corresponding two-
tailed z-test). 
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Table 4: Estimated abnormal returns est(ari), estimated average abnormal returns est(aart), es-
timated cumulative abnormal returns est(cari), and estimated average cumulative abnormal 
returns est(acar) for the five traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy, basis: monthly data 
Month Number of  
negative est(ari)    
based on the one-
factor model     
(number of ari  
which differ from 
zero at the 5% level 
of  significance)          
Number of  
negative est(ari)  
based on the three-
factor model       
(number of ari  
which differ from 
zero at the 5% level 
of  significance)           
est(aart) based on 
the one-factor 
model 
(z-statistic) 
est(aart) based on 
the three-factor 
model 
(z-statistic) 
October  5 
(0) 
5 
(0) 
 -4.50* 
(-1.72) 
 -4.69* 
(-1.85) 
Period Number of  
negative est(cari)    
based on the one-
factor model    
(number of cari 
which differ from 
zero at the 5% level 
of  significance)           
Number of  
negative est(cari) 
based on the three-
factor model         
(number of cari 
which differ from 
zero at the 5% level 
of  significance)           
est(acar) based on 
the one-factor 
model 
(z-statistic) 
est(acar) based 
on the three-
factor model 
(z-statistic) 
October – 
December  
3 
(2) 
4 
(2) 
  -9.60** 
(-2.12) 
 -10.87** 
(-2.47) 
Note: * (**, ***) means that the null hypothesis that the average abnormal returns aart or the average cumulative 
abnormal returns acar are zero can be rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance (according to the corre-
sponding two-tailed z-test). 
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Table 5: Estimated abnormal returns est(ari) and estimated cumulative abnormal returns 
est(cari)for each of the five traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy, basis: daily data 
and three-factor model 
Basis: One-factor model 
 ENBW EON MVV RWE VATTENFALL 
Month Estimated abnormal returns est(ari) 
(z-statistics) 
October  -2.04 (-0.41) 
-12.41* 
(-1.80) 
-4.15 
(-0.71) 
-0.06 
(-0.01) 
-3.85 
(-0.73) 
November  -5.83 (-1.15) 
-8.47 
(-1.23) 
-7.17 
(-1.23) 
 -15.63*** 
(-2.59) 
2.29 
(0.43) 
December   14.20
*** 
(2.82) 
-5.74 
(-0.83) 
11.46** 
(1.97)  
-7.19 
(-1.19) 
-3.40 
(-0.64) 
Period Estimated cumulative abnormal returns est(cari) 
(z-statistics) 
October – 
December 
6.34 
(0.73) 
 -26.62*** 
(-2.90) 
0.15 
(0.01) 
-22.89** 
(-2.27) 
-4.96 
(-0.42) 
Basis: Three-factor model 
 ENBW EON MVV RWE VATTENFALL 
Month Estimated abnormal returns est(ari) 
(z-statistics) 
October  -0.66 (-0.13) 
-12.84* 
(-1.88) 
-4.12 
(-0.75) 
-2.15 
(-0.37) 
-3.67 
(-0.72) 
November  -5.54 (-1.11) 
-9.65 
(-1.42) 
-8.94 
(-1.63) 
 -16.62*** 
(-2.86) 
1.51 
(0.30) 
December   14.35
*** 
(2.88) 
-6.33 
(-0.93) 
11.91** 
(2.17) 
-7.88 
(-1.36) 
-3.74 
(-0.74) 
Period Estimated cumulative abnormal returns est(cari) 
(z-statistics) 
October – 
December 
8.15 
(0.94) 
 -28.81*** 
(-3.28) 
-1.15 
(-0.11) 
 -26.65*** 
(-2.80) 
-5.89 
(-0.50) 
Note: * (**, ***) means that the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns ari or the cumulative abnormal returns 
cari are zero can be rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance (according to the corresponding two-
tailed z-test). 
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Table 6: Estimated abnormal returns est(ari), estimated average abnormal returns est(aart), es-
timated cumulative abnormal returns est(cari), and estimated average cumulative abnormal 
returns est(acar) for the seven corporations exclusively engaged in renewable energies, basis: 
daily data 
Day Number of  
positive est(ari) 
based on the one-
factor model       
(number of ari 
which differ from 
zero at the 5% level 
of significance) 
Number of  
positive est(ari) 
based on the three-
factor model       
(number of ari 
which differ from 
zero at the 5% level 
of significance) 
est(aart) based on 
the one-factor 
model 
(z-statistic) 
est(aart) based on 
the three-factor 
model 
(z-statistic) 
September 23  6 
(1) 
6 
(1) 
   5.22*** 
(2.89) 
   5.72*** 
(3.18) 
Period Number of  
positive est(cari) 
based on the one-
factor model   
(number of cari 
which differ from 
zero at the 5% level 
of significance) 
Number of  
positive est(cari) 
based on the three-
factor model   
(number of cari 
which differ from 
zero at the 5% level 
of significance) 
est(acar) based on 
the one-factor 
model 
(z-statistics) 
est(acar) based on 
the three-factor 
model 
(z-statistics) 
September 23 – 
September 24 
(two trading days  
after the event) 
6 
(0) 
6 
(1) 
 4.69* 
(1.83) 
  5.58** 
(2.19) 
September 23 – 
September 27 
(five trading days  
after the event) 
4 
(0) 
4 
(0) 
1.41 
(0.35) 
2.66 
(0.66) 
September 23 – 
October 11 
(15 trading days 
after the event) 
2 
(0) 
2 
(0) 
-6.71 
(-0.96) 
-3.93 
(-0.56) 
October 01 – 
October 31 
5 
(0) 
6 
(0) 
5.83 
(0.69) 
6.64 
(0.79) 
October 01 – 
December 30 
1 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
-17.05 
  (-1.20) 
-17.97 
  (-1.27) 
Note: * (**, ***) means that the null hypothesis that the average abnormal returns aart or the average cumulative 
abnormal returns acar are zero can be rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance (according to the corre-
sponding two-tailed z-test). 
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Table 7: Estimated abnormal returns est(ari) and estimated cumulative abnormal returns 
est(cari) for each of the seven corporations exclusively engaged in renewable energies, basis: 
daily data and one-factor model 
 EECH ENERGIE-
KONTOR 
NORDEX SOLAR-
PARC 
SOLAR-
WORLD 
SUN-
WAYS 
UMWELT-
KONTOR 
Day Estimated abnormal returns est(ari) 
(z-statistics) 
September 23 -4.52 (-0.85) 
 8.15* 
(1.78) 
3.15 
(0.80) 
0.79 
(0.19) 
7.21 
(1.55) 
13.08** 
(2.42) 
  8.72* 
(1.66) 
September 24  9.49
* 
(1.77) 
-7.06 
(-1.55) 
-5.07 
(-1.29) 
4.19 
(1.02) 
-6.11 
(-1.32) 
1.82 
(0.34) 
-1.00 
(-0.19) 
September 25 -11.07
** 
(-2.07) 
4.07 
(0.89) 
-4.46 
(-1.13) 
0.35 
(0.09) 
-3.36 
(-0.72) 
-2.59 
(-0.48) 
2.07 
(0.39) 
September 26 2.58 (0.48) 
 -7.83* 
(-1.71) 
0.14 
(0.04) 
0.40 
(0.10) 
0.22 
(0.05) 
-1.55 
(-0.29) 
-2.57 
(-0.49) 
September 27  -9.77
* 
(-1.82) 
  -9.13** 
(-2.00) 
0.71 
(0.18) 
0.70 
(0.17) 
  9.09** 
(1.96) 
2.34 
(0.43) 
6.73 
(1.28) 
September 30 -1.94 (-0.36) 
7.28 
(1.59) 
-0.30 
(-0.08) 
0.81 
(0.20) 
-10.75** 
(-2.32) 
 -9.19* 
(-1.70) 
2.87 
(0.55) 
October 01  -34.53
*** 
(-6.45) 
-3.47 
(-0.76) 
 -11.77*** 
(-2.99) 
0.34 
(0.08) 
-1.92 
(-0.41) 
-2.27 
(-0.42) 
-12.72** 
(-2.42) 
October 02  -17.78
*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.92 
(-0.20) 
2.94 
(0.75) 
0.40 
(0.10) 
-2.34 
(-0.50) 
 -9.03* 
(-1.67) 
-5.68 
(-1.08) 
October 03 2.82 (0.53) 
8.46* 
(1.85) 
-0.33 
(-0.08) 
2.46 
(0.60) 
1.24 
(0.27) 
2.82 
(0.52) 
6.13 
(1.17) 
October 04  31.72
*** 
(5.93) 
-1.78 
(-0.39) 
1.64 
(0.42) 
0.71 
(0.17) 
4.61 
(0.99) 
-8.35 
(-1.55) 
1.33 
(0.25) 
October 07 6.29 (1.18) 
7.27 
(1.59) 
2.55 
(0.65) 
-1.07 
(-0.26) 
-6.65 
(-1.43) 
4.42 
(0.82) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
October 08 -4.23 (-0.79) 
-0.68 
(-0.15) 
2.15 
(0.55) 
0.62 
(0.15) 
 7.85* 
(1.69) 
-4.58 
(-0.85) 
 -9.71* 
(-1.85) 
October 09  -14.64
*** 
(-2.73) 
-2.99 
(-0.65) 
4.02 
(1.02) 
0.58 
(0.14) 
-1.78 
(-0.38) 
0.84 
(0.16) 
-4.49 
(-0.86) 
October 10 7.10 (1.33) 
-4.40 
(-0.96) 
 -11.69*** 
(-2.97) 
0.25 
(0.06) 
-6.41 
(-1.38) 
5.86 
(1.08) 
0.97 
(0.18) 
October 11 4.59 (0.86) 
-4.55 
(-0.99) 
6.23 
(1.58) 
 7.01* 
(1.71) 
  10.53** 
  (2.27) 
-4.15 
(-0.77) 
2.51 
(0.48) 
Period Estimated cumulative abnormal returns est(cari) 
(z-statistics) 
September 23 – 
September 24 
4.97 
(0.66) 
1.09 
(0.17) 
-1.93 
(-0.35) 
4.98 
(0.86) 
1.09 
(0.17) 
14.90* 
 (1.95) 
7.73 
(1.04) 
September 23 – 
September 27 
-13.29 
  (-1.11) 
-11.80 
  (-1.15) 
-5.53 
(-0.63) 
6.43 
(0.70) 
7.04 
(0.68) 
13.10 
  (1.08) 
13.96 
 (1.19) 
September 23 – 
October 11 
-33.89 
  (-1.63) 
-7.75 
(-0.43) 
-10.19 
  (-0.66) 
18.53 
  (0.17) 
1.41 
(0.08) 
-10.53 
  (-0.50) 
-4.80 
(-0.24) 
October 01 – 
October 31 
26.39 
  (1.05) 
9.17 
(0.43) 
1.52 
(0.08) 
8.89 
(0.46) 
22.72 
   (1.04) 
-0.89 
 (-0.03) 
-26.98 
  (-1.10) 
October 01 – 
December 30 
-49.95 
  (-1.19) 
-12.88 
  (-0.36) 
-26.94 
  (-0.87) 
-17.59 
  (-0.54) 
19.27 
  (0.53) 
-15.35 
  (-0.36) 
-15.91 
  (-0.39) 
Note: * (**, ***) means that the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns ari or the cumulative abnormal returns 
cari are zero can be rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance (according to the corresponding two-
tailed z-test). 
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Table 8: Estimated abnormal returns est(ari) and estimated cumulative abnormal returns 
est(cari) for each of the seven corporations exclusively engaged in renewable energies, basis: 
daily data and three-factor model 
 EECH ENERGIE-
KONTOR 
NORDEX SOLAR-
PARC 
SOLAR-
WORLD 
SUN-
WAYS 
UMWELT-
KONTOR 
Day Estimated abnormal returns est(ari) 
(z-statistics) 
September 23 -4.40 (-0.82) 
 8.73* 
(1.91) 
4.11 
(1.05) 
1.00 
(0.24) 
8.27* 
(1.79) 
 14.09*** 
(2.62) 
8.26 
(1.58) 
September 24  9.76
* 
(1.83) 
-6.66 
(-1.46) 
-4.31 
(-1.10) 
4.39 
(1.07) 
-5.41 
(-1.17) 
2.65 
(0.49) 
-1.44 
(-0.27) 
September 25 -11.16
** 
(-2.09) 
3.80 
(0.83) 
-4.92 
(-1.26) 
0.24 
(0.06) 
-3.84 
(-0.83) 
-3.10 
(-0.58) 
2.30 
(0.44) 
September 26 3.49 (0.65) 
-7.49 
(-1.64) 
1.08 
(0.28) 
0.74 
(0.18) 
0.62 
(0.13) 
-0.41 
(-0.08) 
-3.36 
(-0.64) 
September 27  -9.32
* 
(-1.75) 
  -9.07** 
(-1.99) 
0.95 
(0.24) 
0.81 
(0.20) 
  9.09** 
(1.97) 
2.73 
(0.51) 
6.41 
(1.22) 
September 30 -2.87 (-0.54) 
7.50 
(1.64) 
-0.37 
(-0.10) 
0.63 
(0.15) 
-10.11** 
(-2.19) 
 -9.47* 
(-1.76) 
3.31 
(0.63) 
October 01  -33.82
*** 
(-6.34) 
-3.48 
(-0.76) 
-11.49*** 
(-2.94) 
0.52 
(0.13) 
-2.13 
(-0.46) 
-1.83 
(-0.34) 
-13.16** 
(-2.51) 
October 02  -17.24
*** 
(-3.23) 
-0.32 
(-0.07) 
4.18 
(1.07) 
0.75 
(0.18) 
-1.33 
(-0.29) 
-7.71 
(-1.43) 
-6.42 
(-1.23) 
October 03 3.10 (0.58) 
 8.45* 
(1.85) 
-0.29 
(-0.07) 
2.50 
(0.61) 
1.13 
(0.25) 
2.97 
(0.55) 
5.96 
(1.14) 
October 04  31.33
*** 
(5.87) 
-1.63 
(-0.36) 
1.69 
(0.43) 
0.64 
(0.16) 
4.99 
(1.08) 
-8.38 
(-1.56) 
1.47 
(0.28) 
October 07 7.21 (1.35) 
 7.51* 
(1.65) 
3.30 
(0.84) 
-0.77 
(-0.19) 
-6.43 
(-1.39) 
5.42 
(1.01) 
-0.71 
(-0.14) 
October 08 -4.81 (-0.90) 
-0.80 
(-0.17) 
1.69 
(0.43) 
0.42 
(0.10) 
7.77* 
(1.68) 
-5.17 
(-0.96) 
 -9.27* 
(-1.77) 
October 09  -14.26
*** 
(-2.67) 
-2.71 
(-0.59) 
4.61 
(1.18) 
0.76 
(0.19) 
-1.36 
(-0.29) 
1.53 
(0.28) 
-4.91 
(-0.94) 
October 10 7.92 (1.48) 
-4.18 
(-0.91) 
-10.95*** 
(-2.80) 
0.54 
(0.13) 
-6.19 
(-1.34) 
6.76 
(1.26) 
0.30 
(0.06) 
October 11 4.69 (0.88) 
-4.68 
(-1.03) 
6.09 
(1.56) 
7.01* 
(1.71) 
10.24** 
(2.22) 
-4.33 
(-0.81) 
2.55 
(0.49) 
Period Estimated cumulative abnormal returns est(cari) 
(z-statistics) 
September 23 – 
September 24 
5.36 
(0.71) 
2.07 
(0.32) 
-0.20 
(-0.04) 
5.39 
(0.93) 
2.86 
(0.44) 
16.74** 
(2.20) 
6.82 
(0.92) 
September 23 – 
September 27 
-11.63 
  (-0.97) 
-10.69 
  (-1.05) 
-3.09 
(-0.35) 
7.18 
(0.78) 
8.73 
(0.85) 
15.96 
  (1.33) 
12.17 
  (1.04) 
September 23 – 
October 11 
-30.35 
  (-1.47) 
-5.04 
(-0.29) 
-4.65 
(-0.31) 
20.19 
  (1.27) 
5.32 
(0.30) 
-4.24 
(-0.20) 
-8.71 
(-0.43) 
October 01 – 
October 31 
28.25 
  (1.13) 
9.76 
(0.46) 
3.10 
(0.17) 
9.49 
(0.49) 
23.37 
  (1.08) 
1.03 
 (0.04) 
-28.54 
  (-1.16) 
October 01 – 
December 30 
-49.82 
  (-1.19) 
-13.69 
  (-0.38) 
-28.96 
  (-0.94) 
-18.16 
  (-0.56) 
17.70 
  (0.49) 
-17.40 
  (-0.41) 
-15.45 
  (-0.37) 
Note: * (**, ***) means that the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns ari or the cumulative abnormal returns 
cari are zero can be rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance (according to the corresponding two-
tailed z-test). 
